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making hearing becomes apparent. In addition, agency rule making
has other advantages over adjudication.8" First, the agencies are
generally staffed with experts in the field of regulation in which they
operate, an expertise seldom enjoyed by the courts." Second, the
agencies, becauise of the wide discretion given to them as regulatory
bodies, have a more comprehensive range of remedies available at
their disposal s Third, judicial intervention could severely limit the
discretion needed by the agencies to provide supervisory and
managerial functions. And, finally, the ability of the agency to act
informally makes it a more suitable forum for eliciting the
information needed to formulate broad policy judgments, such as the
degree of conglomerate media ownership that should be permitted.
Judge Tamm's observations as to the need for judicial scrutiny of
agency rules, however, are not without merit. If representatives of the
public are to have a meaningful right of intervention on matters of
excess concentration of ownership, their right should not depend on
the FCC changing its own pleading rules but rather should be
guaranteed by the courts." The Hale court, then, by balancing the
competing interests of agency discretion and individual rights found
in this instance that the practical effects and inherent advantages of
rulemaking, especially at a time when the rules were being reviewed,
would better resolve the issues of ownership concentration of
broadcast media than would agency adjudication.
V.

ANCILLARY MATTERS

Intervention in Agency Proceedings
In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.' the Federal Trade Commission

permitted a consumer-interest organization to intervene in forma
pauperis in an adjudicatory proceeding involving charges of deceptive
advertising with respect to the price and safety of Firestone tires. The
86. See generally Fuchs, The New Administrative State: JudicialSanctionfor Agency SelfDetermination in the Regulation of Industry, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 216 (1969) (discussion of the

various advantages of agency determination over court adjudication).
87. See Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of "Committed to Agency
Discretion," 82 HARV. L. REv. 367, 382 (1968).

88. See id. at 380.
89. See id. at 387.
90. 425 F.2d at 565-66; Fuchs, supra note 86.

1. 27 AD. L.2d 877 (FTC 1970).

Vol 1971:1491

4 DMINISTRA FIVE LA4 W--1970

229

organization, Students Opposing Unfair Practices, Inc. (SOUP),
alleged that a proposed cease and desist order was inadequate to
protect the public interest but was denied permission to intervene by
the hearing examiner. The Commission allowed an interlocutory
appeal from this decision 2 and granted SOUP permission to intervene
for the limited purposes of exercising reasonable discovery rights,
presenting evidence on the adequacy of the cease and desist order, and
3
presenting briefs and oral argument.
Intervention in administrative proceedings is controlled in four
ways-by statutory provisions, agency rules, agency practices, and
judicial decisions.' The Administrative Procedure Act provides that a
"party" to an agency proceeding includes "a person or agency...
properly seeking and entitled as of right to be admitted as a party ' 5
and permits the participation of "interested parties" in adjudicatory
proceedings "when time, the nature of the proceeding, and the public
interest permit." 6 To the extent that a controversy is not resolved by
consent, such a party is entitled to a full hearing. 7 "Interested
persons," as distinct from "parties," are permitted to appear before
an agency to present evidence or request determination of an issue "so
far as the orderly conduct of public business permits."" The statutory
provision governing intervention before the FTC is even less precise,
indicating only that "upon good cause shown" one may be permitted
by the Commission to intervene. 9 The applicable rule promulgated by
the agency indicates only that the hearing examiner or Commission
may permit intervention upon such terms as "provided by law or as
otherwise may be deemed proper."' 1 The statutory provisions and
regulations governing intervention before other agencies illustrate the
lack of uniformity among the agencies in this area. The
Communications Act permits "any party in interest"" to file a
2. Id. at 880.
3. Id. The case was remanded to the hearing examiner for further proceedings.
4. 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 8.11, at 564 (1958) [hereinafter cited to
as DAVIS].
5. 5 U.S.C. § 551(3) (Supp. V, 1970).
6. Id. § 554(c)(1).
7. Id. § 554(c)(2). See also section 555(b), which provides that a party may appear in person
or by counsel and section 556(d), which permits a party to present evidence and conduct cross-

examination.
8. Id. § 555(b).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1964). See also FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 26, n.2 (1929).
10. 16 C.F.R. § 3.14 (1970).

11. 47 U.S.C. § 309(d)(1) (1964).
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petition to oppose a license application before the Federal

Communications Commission, but the Commission is authorized to
dispose of such a petition without a hearing if it raises no "substantial
and material questions of fact."' 2 If such a question is raised,
however, a hearing must be held.13
Detailed rules regarding intervention have also been promulgated
by the Federal Power Commission. The statutory provision
authorizing intervention gives the FPC complete discretion to admit

parties and specifically includes "any representative of interested
consumers" on the list of possible parties." The regulations provide

that any party intervening under a right conferred by statute,
representing interests which are not already adequately protected, or

representing the public interest will be granted status as a party or be
permitted to intervene in such limited fashion as is necessary or

appropriate. 15 The statute governing proceedings of the Civil
Aeronautics Board mandates only that they be in conformance with
the APA and that any person may appear before the Board and be

heard in person. 16 The Board has, however, promulgated detailed rules
regarding intervention. 17 At hearings other than enforcement pro-

ceedings,; any person may appear to present evidence and, with the
consent of the hearing examiner, cross-examine witnesses.'" Formal
intervention as a party is permitted only in cases to be decided upon

an evidentiary record after notice and hearing. Status as a party is
granted to those having a statutory right to become a party but may
12. Id. § 309(d)(2). A material question of fact is one which is material to a determination of
whether the public interest, convience, or necessity will be served by the granting of the
application in question. COMMUNICATIONS AcT AMENDMENTS, H.R. No. 1800, 1960 U.S
CODE CONG. & ADM. NEws 3516, 3520 (June 13, 1960).
13. Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1006-07
(D.C. Cir. 1966); 47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (1964). The hearing examiner may also grant the right to
intervene as a party to any person without such a showing, 47 C.F.R. § 1.223(b) (1970), and the
Comniission's rules specifically provide that no person will be denied the right to intervene for
the limited purpose of giving testimony for lack of sufficient interest to justify his intervention as
a party. Id. § 1.225(b).
14. 16 U.S.C. § 825g(a) (1964).
15. 18 C.F.R. §§ 1.8(b),(f)(2) (1970). When the Commission does permit intervention it
normally does so without conceding that the party in question is aggrieved in fact or otherwise,
See, e.g., Arizona Power Authority, F.P.C. Project 2702 (Nov. 18, 1970); Tennessee Gas
Pipeline Co., F.P.C. No. RP 71-6 (Nov. 18, 1970).
16. 49 U.S.C. § 1481 (1964).
17. 14 C.F.R. § 302.14 (1970) (participation in hearing cases by persons not parties);
id. § 302.15 (formal intervention in hearing cases).
18. Id. § 302.14(b). Such persons may also file briefs.
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also be granted to any person whose intervention will be "conducive
to the ends of justice" and will not unduly delay the proceedings. 9
In addition to the specific requirements of the agency in question,
an intervenor must also meet several prerequisites of more general
applicability. A petition to intervene must be timely filed,2 although
agencies normally retain discretion to permit late filing if good cause
for the delay is shown. 21 Intervention may be denied altogether if the

interest of the intervenor is already adequately represented 22 or if the
information he is seeking to provide would be merely duplicative of
materials presented by parties already participating. 23 Similarly, the
evidence presented and issues raised by the intervenor must be
pertinent and material to the matters being considered. 24 If permitting

intervention will lead to an undue broadening of the issues or delay the
proceedings for other reasons, it may also be refused. 25 In addition,
agencies routinely inquire whether the intervenor's participation in the
proceedings will be in the public interest. 2 Thus, intervention as a
party requires the showing of a right to intervene, in terms of both the

possible resultant injury and the provisions of an applicable statute; a
showing that the evidence to be presented and issues to be raised are
material to those being considered in the proceeding; and a showing
that the participation of the intervenor will not be duplicative. With
the exception of the adjustments necessary to assure that
19. Id. § 302.15(a). In granting intervention the Board stipulates, as does the Federal
Power Commission, that it does not thereby concede that the intervenor has such a substantial
interest in the matter in question as to entitle him to judicial review of any Board decision.
Id. § 302.15(d). See Palisades Citizen's Ass'n, Inc. v. CAB, 400 F.2d 188 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
(Formal intervention denied, but informal participation permitted).
20. See, e.g., Easton Util. Comm'n v. AEC, 424 F.2d 847, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Smith &
Solomon Trucking Co. v. United States, 255 F. Supp. 243, 250 (D.N.J. 1966) (I.C.C.); 14
C.F.R. § 302.15(c)(2) (C.A.B.); 18 C.F.R. § 1.8(d) (1970) (F.P.C.); 47 C.F.R. § 1.223(b)
(1970) (F.C.C.).
21. See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. § 302.15(c)(2) (1970) (C.A.B.); 18 C.F.R. § 1.8(d) (F.P.C.); 47
C.F.R. § 1.223(d) (1970) (F.C.C.). When tardy intervention is permitted, the intervenor's
participation may be limited so as not to delay the completion of the proceedings. San Antonio
v. CAB, 374 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Wilson &Co., Inc. v. United States, 335 F.2d 788, 79596 (7th Cir. 1964).
22. San Antonio v. CAB, 374 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Duke Power Co., 24 AD. L.2D
1057, 1059 (AEC 1968).
23. American Tel. &Tel. Co., 20 AD. L.2d 78, 81 (F.C.C. 1966).
24. See, e.g., Martin-Trigona v. FCC, 432 F.2d 682, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
25. 1 DAVIS § 8.11, at 564.
26. See, e.g., National Capital Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 419 F.2d 668, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 908 (1970); First Nat'l Bank Corp., 27 AD. L.2D 82-84 (Fed. Res. Bd.
1970).
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administrative proceedings remain manageable,2 these standards are
similar to those required to show standing for judicial review. Indeed,
cases concerning the question of standing to seek judicial review have
been used interchangeably with those resolving questions of standing
to intervene.?' In the law of intervention, as with the law of standing,
the trend has been away from the "closed concept" of a legally
protected interest as the basis for the right to intervene to such criteria
as potential economic injury, with respect to competitors, or
representation of the public interest by persons aggrieved in fact. 9
The courts have applied two distinct theories of standing to obtain
judicial review in order to reach the question whether intervention in
the "public interest" should be permitted in an agency proceeding.
The first, the "private-attorney general" theory, is invoked when a
specific statute providing for judicial review is applicable30 and
permits one who has been adversely affected by the decision of the
administrative agency in question to bring suit to vindicate the public
interest.31 Competitors and others not generally considered publicinterest groups who are aggrieved have been granted standing on these
grounds.32 Recently, standing has also been granted on the basis of the
private attorney general concept even though a specific review statute
was not in question on the theory that section 10(a) of the APA was
applicable in the absence of such a statute.34 The second theory of
standing utilized by the courts in intervention cases is applied when no
specific statute providing for judicial review is applicable.3 5 In these
cases, after ascertaining that the plaintiff has suffered economic or
personal injury, the courts have sought to determine whether the
substantive statutory provision invokedeither explicitly or implicitly,
27. Agencies are typically allowed broad discretion in these matters. See, e.g., WFTL

Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 376 F.2d 782 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
28. National Welfare Rights Org. v. Finch, 429 F.2d 725, 732-33 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
29. Id. at 733; Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994,

1002-04 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
30. 429 F.2d at 732.

31. FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Stations, 308 U.S. 470 (1940); Associated Indus. v.
Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir.), dismissed as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).
32. See, e.g., Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 14-15 (1942).
33. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. V, 1970).

34. Ballerina Pen Co. v. Kunzig, 433 F.2d 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Scanwell Labs., Inc. v.
Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Keco Indus., Inc. v. United States, 428 F.2d 1233 (Ct.

Cl. 1970).
35. Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968); Chicago Junction Case, 264 U.S. 258

(1924).
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reflected a legislative purpose to protect the interest asserted.3 6
Recently, this lest has been liberalized so that the appropriate
inquiries are whether the challenged action caused the plaintiff injury
in fact, economic or otherwise, and whether the interest sought to be
protected is arguably within the zone of interests sought to be
regulated or protected by the statute in question.3 7 In an early decision
involving intervention in an FPC proceeding3 the court determined
that the petitioners were proper parties to be granted standing to
obtain judicial review as private-attorneys general and also indicated
that such a party clearly had a right to intervene in the administrative
proceedings below.3 9 Similar issues were involved in a later case in
which the FCC denied the right to intervene to a trade union on the
ground that the union sought to broaden the issues being considered in
the proceeding.4 0 Again the court concluded that the union had
standing on the basis of the private-attorney general theory and held
that one with such a recognized interest in the outcome of an agency
proceeding must be permitted to participate in it fully from the outset.
While judicial review in this instance was not limited by statute to
those who had participated in the agency proceeding,4" the court
pointed out that full intervention was a practical necessity since the
union's right to judicial review would not be effective unless it had the
opportunity to present evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and present
arguments at the agency hearing. 2 The court also noted that section 6
of the APA43 limits the discretion of agencies in denying intervention
because it grants "any interested person" the right to appear and be
heard in a proceeding "so far as the orderly conduct of public
business permits," thereby apparently curtailing the discretion of the
4
agencies in favor of permitting at least limited intervention.
36. 390 U.S. at 6.
37. Association of Data Processing Service Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Barlow v.
Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
38. National Coal Ass'n v. FPC, 191 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1951). See also Virginia
Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. FPC, 265 F.2d 364 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
39. In justifying this conclusion the court observed that only parties to Commission
proceedings could obtain judicial review and that if it did not look beyond a decision by the
Commission to deny intervention, such denials could be effectively used to foreclose all judicial
review. 191 F.2d at 467. See also Juarez Gas Co. v. FPC, 375 F.2d 595, 597 (D.C. Cir. 1967);
Lynchburg Gas Co. v. FPC, 284 F.2d 756, 760-61 (3d Cir. 1960).
40. American Communications Ass'n v. United States, 298 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1962).
41. Compare 47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (1964), with 16 U.S.C. § 825(l) (1964).
42. 298 F.2d at 650-51.
43. 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (Supp. V, 1970).
44. 298 F.2d at 640. See also Philadelphia Electric Co. (Peach Bottom Atomic Power
Station Units 2 & 3), 25 AD. L.2D 85, 87 (AEC 1968).
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In Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v.
5 in which petitioners sought to intervene in a license renewal
FCC,"
proceeding on the ground that the television station's programs
reflected racial bias, the court reviewed the history of the private
attorney general theory and utilized the standards developed
thereunder in holding that one of petitioners was properly qualified to
intervene as a party in interest consistent with the applicable statute."
The court noted that public interest groups could contribute
materially to Commission proceedings by providing information to
which the FCC did not have access, such as monitoring studies.
Recognizing the possible impairment of the Commission's efficiency
which could result if intervention were permitted too freely, the court
directed that the agency select one of the petitioners to intervene in
behalf of the public interest, observing that at some point the viewing
public should have an opportunity to make itself heard even if
administrative efficiency were slightly impaired. The Church of Christ
rationale was applied in National Welfare Rights Organization v.
Finch4 7 in which the court permitted intervention in agency
proceedings being conducted to determine whether state welfare laws
were in compliance with Social Security Act requirements. The
administrator and the state agencies interpreted the applicable statute
and agency rule 48 to mean that only the state could be a party to such
a hearing but nevertheless permitted the Welfare Organization to
submit information and arguments in connection with the
negotiations. Injunctive relief permitting more extensive participation
was sought. In deciding in favor of the Welfare Organization the
court observed that intervention in administrative proceedings is
governed in some measure by the law of standing,4 that section 10 of
the APA creates a presumption favoring judicial review, and that the
Welfare Organization was injured in fact and was a group
representative of interests which were to be protected by the statute.50
While the statute in question provided only that the states should have
judicial review of such decisions, the court did not find that this in any
way indicated that welfare recipients should not also have review.
45. 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See also Office of Communication of United Church of
Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1969).

46. 47 U.S.C. § 309(d)(1) (1964)..
47. 429 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
48. 42 U.S.C. 604(a) (Supp. V, 1970); 45 C.F.R. § 201.5 (1970).
49. 429 F.2d at 732.
50. See notes 35-37 supra and accompanying text.

Vol. 1971:149]

A DMINISTRA TI VE LA W-1970

Concluding that the Welfare Organization could represent the public
as a private attorney general, the court granted it the right to call
witnesses and cross-examine other parties, thereby broadening the
limited intervention permitted by the Administrator. The National
Welfare Rights Organization case, perhaps more than any other
decision, indicates that the courts will make every effort to permit
reasonable participation in administrative proceedings by at least one
person or organization as a representative of the public interest, when
his interest or reason for participation is bona fide.
In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. 51 the FTC modified views
expressed in an earlier 1970 decision, Campbell Soup Co.,52 wherein it
had denied SOUP the right to broaden its limited participation in a
proceeding involving a proposed cease and desist order concerning
false advertising - the placing of glass marbles at the bottom of a
soup bowl to make the soup appear more chunky in a television
commercial. SOUP's petition to intervene more extensively in
Campbell Soup Co. was denied because the Commission did not think
the matter merited the expenditure of the additional resources which
would be needed to consider a harsher penalty such as affirmative
disclosure. In denying that petition the Commission set forth two
criteria for intervention: that the intervenors raise substantial issues of
law or fact that would not otherwise be properly raised and that such
issues be sufficiently important to justify expenditure of the
Commission's resources.0 In Firestone, the Commission added three
further criteria: the intervenor's ability to contribute to the resolution
of the case; the need for expedition in the handling of the case; and
possible prejudice to the rights of the original parties. 54 One
distinction made by the Commission between Firestoneand Campbell
Soup was that in the former a public safety issue was involved,
making the case a particularly appropriate one for affirmative
disclosure. The Commission also indicated that intervention in
Firestone might contribute to a fuller appreciation of the need for
stronger remedies in FTC cases. The Commission characterized the
right to intervene as a "matter of privilege," 5 5 apparently not
recognizing that "any interested person" has at least a limited right
to intervene "so far as the orderly conduct of business permits." 5 6 In
51. 27 AD. L.2D 877 (FTC 1970).
52. 26 AD. L.2D 1011 (FTC1970).
53. Id. at 1013-15.
54. 27 AD. L.2 at 879.

55. id.
56. See notes 43-44 supraand accompanying text.
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addition, it expressed some reluctance and apprehension in permitting
intervention, indicating that its decision was to have limited
precedential value, if any, and that this step was being taken on a
probationary basis. At least part of this reluctance was apparently
due to the belief that public interest intervention is not as necessary in
FTC proceedings as in those of other agencies, because the FTC "has
a built-in-public-interest prosecutor in all of its proceedings." 7
Commissioner Maclntyre argued in a separate statement that the
intervention rights granted to SOUP were too broad and were likely
to cause undue delay in the proceeding, such that a substantial denial
58
of justice would result.
The Firestone decision undoubtedly is an important one for the
Federal Trade Commission, notwithstanding the Commission's claim
that the case has limited precedential value, since the Commission has
not customarily permitted public interest intervenors to take part in
adjudicatory proceedings. However, its impact is necessarily limited
in that other agencies appear to be more liberal in permitting
intervention. The Civil Aeronautics Board's regulations, for example,
permit any interested person to make an appearance to present
evidence, except at enforcement proceedings .5 In considering a license
application, the Federal Communications Commission is required to
grant a hearing to any party in interest who raises a "substantial and
material" question of fact,60 and FCC rules permit any interested
person to intervene for the limited purpose of presenting testimony."
The primary advance made by SOUP beyond such routine
participation is their attainment of "reasonable and necessary"
discovery rights. Although the Commission indicates that SOUP has
been given "all the rights of a party"6 2 with respect to the limited
purpose for which it was permitted to intervene, it is not at all clear
from the Commission's order whether SOUP has been granted the
vital right to cross-examine. However, even though SOUP was not
granted full status as a party and it appears that under the applicable
57. 27 AD. L.2D at 879.
58. Id. at 880-81.
59. See notes 17-18 supra and accompanying text. Compare Moss v. C.A.B. 430 F.2d 891
(D.C. Cir. 1970), discussed at p. 200 supra.
60. See notes 11-13 supra and accompanying text. But see Hale v. FCC, 425 F.2d 526 (D.C.
Cir. 1970), discussed at p. 223 supra.
61. See note 13 supra. But see Comment, Administrative Agencies, the PublicInterest, and
NationalPolicy: Is a MarriagePossible?59 Gao. L.J. 420, 445 (1970).
62. 27 AD. L.2D at 878.

Vol. 1971:149]

A DMINISTRA TI VE LA W-1970

statute they could not obtain judicial review of an adverse decision,6
SOUP was apparently granted sufficient rights to carry out its
purpose. Significantly, the Commission permitted intervention in
forma pauperis, for SOUP, like many public-interest intervernors,
undoubtedly has limited financial backing.6 For these reasons the
Commission's decision in Firestone appears to be a sincere step
forward in ensuring that the public interest is represented before the
Commission. While the Commission indicates that the difference
between Firestone and Campbell Soup is that Firestone involves a
question of public safety, it appears in reality that in Firestone the
Commission simply relaxed the position taken in the earlier case.
Firestone undoubtedly was a more compelling case because it did
involve a public safety question. However, SOUP's contention was
basically the same in both cases: that the adverse effect of deceptive
advertising on both competitors and the public continued long after
the advertising campaign itself was discontinued and that affirmative
action was required to negate its residual effects. While Firestone did
not affirm this view, by permitting intervention it did decide that this
contention presented a factual question on which evidence was needed
before a proper sanction could be imposed, precisely the position
63. The pertinent statutory provisions indicate that only parties made subject to a cease and
desist order or other penalty imposed by the Commission have the right to obtain judicial review
of a Commission decision. 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(b), (c), (1), & 56 (1964); see Wholesale Grocer's
Ass'n v. F.T.C., 277 F. 657, 661 (5th Cir. 1922). See also FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 25-26
(1929). But see National Coal Ass'n v. FPC, 191 F.2d 462,466-67 (D.C. Cir. 1951), wherein the
court held that the F.P.C. could not use its discretion to exclude intervenors as a mechanism to
prevent them from obtaining judicial review, where the applicable statute provided that those
seeking judicial review must have participated in the agency proceedings below. Since the FTC's
discretion to deny intervention is limited by the APA, see notes 43-44 supra and accompanying
text, it is arguable that if a group like SOUP were arbitrarily denied permission to intervene in
FTC proceedings they might be granted judicial review for the purpose of deciding whether their
right to limited intervention had been abused.
64. Even though some agencies appear increasingly receptive to public-interest intervenors,
the financial obstacles to participation may limit the potential benefits from this trend. Most
agencies require multiple copies of any documents being submitted, see, e.g., 14 C.F.R.
§ 302.3(c) (1970) (C.A.B. requires an original and 19 copies), and copies must often be mailed
to every participant in a proceeding. Another major expense is the purchase of transcripts of
agency hearings. Many, if not all, the federal agencies individually negotiate contracts with
various transcribing services from which interested parties must buy transcripts if they desire to
have them. The result is that fees vary widely: 20 cents per page at the FPC; 45 cents per page at
the CAB; 50 cents per page at the FTC; 85 cents per page at th" ICC; and 95 cents at the SEC.
These figures were specified in contracts with reporting services for the period ending June 30,
1970, and represent the minimum charge to the public; certain expedited copies of SEC
transcripts, for example, might cost as much as $2.50 per page. There have been indications in
1970 that the agencies are becoming aware of the financial burden which such expenses represent
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rejected by the denial of more extensive intervention in Campbell
Soup.A5 Apart from the FTC, whether public-interest intervention will
have any significant impact on administrative agencies is difficult to
forecast. Cases such as Church of Christ, in which the petitioners
attempted unsuccessfully for more than ten years to have a television
station's license revoked, illustrate the hurdles. The agencies have
exhibited irritation and hostility toward efforts which have the effect
of enlarging their constituencies. To the extent that there is such
hostility it can result in the exercise of administrative discretion in a
manner unfavorable to the intervenor and cause delay when the
intervenor appeals such decisions. 6 Absent such hostility there will
still be a great deal of litigation generated by public-interest
intervenors who take a position adverse to that of the private party
involved, as in Firestone. In addition to clogging the dockets, such
delay may in some cases mitigate the effects of any just conclusion
that is reached.6 7 Moreover, to sustain such prolonged litigation, a
public-interest intervenor must be well-organized and well-financed.
Not-withstanding these difficulties, so long as public-interest
intervenors can continue to participate in agency proceedings, even if
in only a limited number of cases, it seems inescapable that such
participation will ultimately result in more careful administrative
action. The Firestonedecision is an example of precisely this effect.
VI.

HEARINGS

Administrative Discovery
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in NLRB v.
to individual intervenors who do not have adequate financial backing. The FCC granted the
request of a student group that it be permitted to file only the original and one copy of its
petition. Interview with Mr. Bass, Broadcasting Rules and Standards, FCC, July 9, 1970,

concerning the oralpermissionin Petition for Rule Making of TUBE (Termination of Unfaii
Broadcasting Practices) for Adoption of Standards Designed to Eliminate Deceptive

Advertising From Television, RM 1553, filed Jan. 13, 1970. The FTC granted two requests
concerning transcripts in 1970. Student participants in Campbell Soup Co. were granted a free

transcript and permission to file single copies of documents. 26 AD. L.2D at 1016. Second, a
Washington consurher-protection group was permitted to buy a transcript of proceedings at the
lesser FTC photocopying rate-30 cents per page instead of 50 cents. Letter from Joseph W.

Shea, Secretary, FTC, to Benny Kass, February 25, 1970.
65. See separate statement of Commissioner Elman, 26 AD. L.2D at 1016.

66. See, e.g., Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543
(D.C. Cir. 1969).

67. See separate statement of Commissioner Maclntyre, 427 AD. L.2D at 880.

